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REVIEWING THE UNITED NATIONS
FISH STOCKS TREATY
By David A. Balton and Holly R. Koehler*
INTRODUCTION
ike a number of key stocks of fish in the world’s oceans,
good news on the subject of international fisheries has
become less plentiful. The international community has
grappled for years with growing concern over the state of the
marine environment, particularly the health of living marine
resources and their habitats. The conservation and management
of fish stocks whose ranges extend across the lines that separate
ocean areas under national jurisdiction and the high seas pose
particular challenges. Without cooperation among nations, there
can be no effective regulation of such resources, including for
so-called “straddling fish stocks” and “highly migratory fish
stocks.”1
In an effort to address these concerns, the United Nations
adopted the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (“UNFSA”) in 1995.2
Together with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization’s (“FAO”) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries3
and the High Seas Fishing Compliance Agreement,4 the UNFSA
has established robust international principles and standards at
the global level for the regulation of ocean fisheries. The
UNFSA entered into force in 2001 and now has 61 States Parties. But how well is it working? How much impact is it having?
What more can be done to strengthen its implementation?
The States Parties to the UNFSA and other interested participants met recently at the United Nations to answer these
questions. This article will summarize the outcomes of the
UNFSA Review Conference and will consider the prospects for
this vital treaty in dealing with marine fisheries.

L

THE REVIEW CONFERENCE PROCESS
Article 36 of the UNFSA provides that within four years of
the entry into force of the Agreement a conference would be
convened to review and assess the adequacy of the Agreement in
securing the conservation and management of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, and to propose means of
strengthening its implementation.5 This Review Conference
took place at the United Nations in New York from May 22–26,
2006. In preparation for the Conference, a fifth round of informal consultations of States Parties to the Agreement (“ICSPs”)
was held.6 During this fifth ICSP, two major and inter-related
sentiments emerged that would shape the tenor and structure of
the upcoming Review Conference: (1) that the review should be
robust, balanced, and result in outcomes based on a rigorous
assessment; and (2) that the Review Conference should consider
and try to address certain persistent concerns expressed by nonparties regarding particular aspects of the Agreement.7
On the first point, many participants in the fifth ICSP, partic5

ularly States Parties to the Agreement, insisted that the Review
Conference proceed in a structured and focused manner. These
Parties were concerned that a haphazard review of the Agreement would be counterproductive, yielding overly negative
results that unfairly blame the continued problems facing international fisheries on deficiencies in an agreement that had
entered into force only four years earlier. Participants also worried that an unstructured or unbalanced review would open the
door to premature proposals to amend the Agreement.8 As a
result, the fifth ICSP developed a program of work for the Conference that laid out how the review and assessment component
of the meeting would be organized.9 To facilitate that process, it
also identified a series of framework questions and elements.10
The second issue — the concerns of non-parties — emerged
several months earlier during the negotiation of the annual UN
General Assembly resolution on sustainable fisheries.11 There,
several non-parties to the UNFSA argued that they should be
able to participate in the Review Conference process on an equal
footing with States Parties. A debate on this point took center
stage in the fifth ICSP, which had the mandate to prepare the
rules of procedure for the Review Conference. Views on this
issue quickly became polarized. Many non-parties considered
the Review Conference to be a United Nations meeting in which
all UN members had equal standing.12 Virtually all States Parties, by contrast, saw the Review Conference as a meeting of
Parties to the Agreement: where others may also be invited, but
in which only States Parties had the ultimate say on matters
involving the implementation of a treaty to which only States
Parties are legally bound. States Parties were also concerned
with the public calls by some non-parties to either amend or
reinterpret certain provisions of the Agreement in order to satisfy their specific concerns.13 These competing concerns shaped
the discussions at the Review Conference, the work of its drafting committee, and the subsequent Conference results.
The United States played a leadership role in the Review
Conference, providing a positive and constructive mediating
presence. The United States chaired the Conference, as well as
the fifth ICSP and several other small informal working groups
during the preparatory phase. The United States also led efforts
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to craft compromises on a number of difficult issues, such as the
rules of procedure and further reviews of the UNFSA.
As a result of the discussions at the fifth ICSP, the Review
Conference adopted a process to review and assess the adequacy
of the provisions of the Agreement and to propose means to
strengthen their implementation. To facilitate this process, the
fifth ICSP organized the assessment into four general cluster
areas, each based on the parts of the UNFSA: (1) Conservation
and management of stocks; (2) Mechanisms for international
cooperation; (3) Monitoring, control and surveillance, compliance and enforcement; and (4) Developing states parties and
non-parties.
The following section will examine the major themes that
emerged from the review and assessment of each cluster area,
and will highlight recommendations made to strengthen the
implementation of the Agreement.14

RESULTS OF THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE15

The UNFSA has
established robust
international principles
and standards at the
global level for the
regulation of ocean
fisheries.

The Conference f irst
reviewed progress made by
States and regional f isheries
management organizations and
arrangements (“RFMOs”) in
conserving and managing highly
migratory stocks and straddling
fish stocks. While progress has
been made in this area since the
adoption of UNFSA, more must
be done to strengthen and reinforce conservation and management measures. According to the
FAO, nearly 30 percent of the stocks of highly migratory tuna
and tuna-like species and nearly two-thirds of the straddling fish
stocks and the stocks of other high-seas fishery resources are
overexploited or depleted. In light of this information, the Conference called for greater reliance on the precautionary approach
to manage fisheries in accordance with the best available scientific information.16 The Conference found that timely and accurate data collection remains a challenge and that the lack of good
data undermines scientific advice and sound management
decisions. The Conference called for the elimination of fishing
subsidies that result in over-fishing and illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (“IUU”) fishing activities.17 The Conference also
acknowledged that two new RFMOs had been developed since
the adoption of the UNFSA, with negotiations underway for a
third in the South Pacific. However, a number of developing
States reported that the costs associated with participating in
RFMOs can be prohibitively high.18
Second, in the area of international cooperation, the Conference emphasized the importance of RFMOs in the conservation
and management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks.
While progress has been made to strengthen the mandates of
RFMOs, particularly with respect to compliance and enforcement, member States of these regional management organizaFALL 2006

tions must do much more to modernize the functions of the
RFMOs and to enhance their performance. RFMOs are adopting
a range of measures to cooperate in the conservation and management of stocks under their purview, particularly in dealing
with IUU fishing. These measures include the establishment of
positive and negative vessel lists, market-related measures, catch
and trade documentation schemes, port control measures, satellite vessel monitoring systems, and regulations for transshipment.19 However gaps in RFMO coverage remain, both
geographically and with respect to the fisheries covered.20
Third, in the monitoring, control and surveillance, and compliance and enforcement cluster area, the Conference noted that
both States and RFMOs have taken significant strides but, once
again, more work needs to be done by RFMOs and States that
either authorize vessels to fish
on the high seas or provide ports
and markets for fish and fish
products. The Conference further recognized that significant
levels of IUU fishing continue
to occur due to ineffective control over vessels, inadequate
investigations of violations and
levels of penalties imposed, a
lack of enforcement capacity in
d eve l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , t h e
porous nature of some port State
control systems, and insufficient
cooperation and coordination
among States and RFMOs.
Finally, with regard to
developing States and nonparties, the Conference underscored the importance of the
Agreement in achieving sustainable fisheries, but also emphasized the need to encourage additional States to adhere to the
Agreement. The Conference further recognized that developing
States require assistance to fulfill their obligations under the
Agreement. To participate effectively in RFMOs and implement
conservation and management measures domestically, developing States need assistance in the areas of human resource
development, training, technology transfer, scientific stock
assessment and research, and implementing compliance and
enforcement measures. In addition, with respect to broadening
participation in the Agreement, several non-parties identified
certain concerns they have with provisions of the Agreement
itself, specifically Articles 7, 21, 22, and 23, that they view as
obstacles to their becoming a party.
The Review Conference agreed on a comprehensive set of
recommendations in each cluster area that called upon States,
RFMOs, and technical bodies of the United Nations to undertake certain actions and initiatives to strengthen the substance
and methods of implementation of the Agreement. The recommendations in each area serve to focus attention on particular
implementation needs, such as the enhanced use of science in
decision-making, increased cooperation among States and
6
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Sebastes in Alaska waters.

organizations, the incorporation of ecosystem considerations
into fisheries management, strengthened control over vessels,
companies, and nationals that engage in IUU fishing activities,
better and more timely collection and sharing of fisheries data,
the modernization of RFMOs to include new principles and
practices of international fisheries conservation and management, and further provision of assistance to developing countries.
Many of the Conference recommendations built upon other
recent calls to action, such as by the UN General Assembly and
FAO. However, there are several distinct recommendations from
the Conference that define this meeting as taking a step forward
to address ongoing problems with international fisheries management. These recommendations include commitments to:
• establish new RFMOs where none exist and to agree on
interim management measures until such organizations are
established;
• urgently reduce the capacity of the world’s fishing fleets to
sustainable levels by establishing targets and plans for
ongoing assessments;
• strengthen data collection and reporting, including
through regular audits of compliance with such obligations;
• initiate negotiations through the FAO to develop a legally
binding instrument on port State measures;
• undertake performance reviews of RFMOs based on transparent criteria, which would include some element of
independent evaluation, and make these reviews publicly
available;
• adopt stringent measures to regulate transshipment, particularly at sea; and
• develop processes to assess the performance of States in
implementing their obligations regarding their fishing vessels (i.e., flag State duties).
7

Perhaps most significantly, the Review Conference revealed widespread support for the UNFSA
as the preeminent instrument in the field of international fisheries management. This reflects a considerable improvement in overall attitudes toward the
treaty. At the time of its adoption in 1995, and even
as it entered into force in 2001, a number of influential governments continued to express doubts about
the UNFSA. Their concerns focused particularly on
several of its innovative provisions, such as the precautionary approach to fisheries management, the
requirement that management measures be compatible throughout the range of a fish stock, and certain
enforcement rules. By contrast, virtually all governments represented at the Review Conference —
even those not yet party to the UNFSA — indicated
their acceptance of the treaty as an expression of
basic standards for the management of ocean fisheries.
One telling example of these changing attitudes toward the
UNFSA was the general willingness of the Parties to expand its
scope for use in the management of fisheries for other categories
of stocks. The UNFSA, by its terms, applies only to the conservation and management of two select categories of fisheries,
namely, fisheries for “straddling fish stocks” and for “highly
migratory fish stocks.” The participants in the Review Conference nevertheless “encouraged States, as appropriate, to recognize that the general principles of the Agreement should also
apply to fisheries for discrete fish stocks on the high seas,” —
i.e., those stocks of fish that occur solely on the high seas.
The growing number of States Parties to the UNFSA provides further evidence of increasing support for this treaty. At
the time of the Review Conference in May 2006, the UNFSA
had 57 States Parties, including most States with significant
interests in international fisheries.21 Some 14 non-Parties also
announced or reaffirmed their intention to adhere to the treaty in
the near future. Four of those (Trinidad and Tobago, Slovenia,
Estonia, and Japan) have become States Parties in the few
months since the end of the Review Conference.22
Additionally, many States — both parties and non-parties to
the UNFSA — have begun to incorporate its provisions into
their domestic laws and regulations. Many States are now requiring fishing vessels to observe all relevant fishing rules before
authorizing them to fish on the high seas. Some nations have also
begun to contribute funds and other resources to assist developing countries in the implementation of the UNFSA, with the
goals of improving fisheries management within the vast areas
under the jurisdiction of developing States and of monitoring the
high seas fishing operations of vessels that fly the flags of developing States.
Similarly, most of the RFMOs created to regulate fisheries
for straddling or highly migratory fish stocks have incorporated
key provisions of the UNFSA into their charters or regulatory
schemes. Some other long-standing RFMOs, including the InterSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY

American Tropical Tuna Commission and the General Fisheries
Commission for the Mediterranean, have revised their charters
to incorporate provisions of the UNFSA. Other RFMOs may
soon follow this trend. For example, the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Organization embarked on an ambitious reassessment
of its founding treaty and may incorporate elements of UNFSA.
Finally, the UNFSA has become the point of departure for negotiations to establish new RFMOs, including the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Southeast Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, and the South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission.
However, daunting challenges to full implementation of the
UNFSA certainly remain. The treaty still does not enjoy universal
— or even near-universal — adherence. Several nations with
major fishing fleets, including the People’s Republic of China, the
Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and many Latin American and
African countries, remain outside the circle of States Parties. The
recent ratification by Japan may prompt some of those nations to
adhere, but this is not certain by any means. Both parties and
non-parties struggle to collect
and analyze the scientific and
fisheries data necessary to support sound management decisions, and to secure the resources
necessary to monitor fishing
activities.
As noted above, some nonparties took the occasion of the
Review Conference to reiterate
long-held concerns about particular aspects of the UNFSA that,
in their view, remain obstacles to
their adherence. For some nonparties, the principal issue arises
from Articles 21 and 22 of the
treaty. These provisions authorize fisheries enforcement personnel from States Parties under limited circumstances to board
and inspect high seas fishing vessels of other States Parties to
monitor for compliance with regionally agreed fishing rules.
Some non-parties voiced concern that these provisions unduly
undermine the basic rule of exclusive flag State jurisdiction over
fishing vessels on the high seas. Other non-parties feared that the
authority to board and inspect high seas fishing vessels could be
abused; e.g., to interfere with the legitimate fishing activities of a
competing fishing fleet.
Some non-parties are also concerned about preserving the
privileges of coastal States. These non-parties called for assurances that Article 7 of the UNFSA, which requires that measures
for a fish stock be compatible throughout the range of that stock,
be implemented in ways that preserve the exclusive jurisdiction
of coastal States to manage fisheries within waters under their
jurisdiction. Despite the lack of evidence that implementation of
Article 7 has undermined coastal State prerogatives, the issue
remains a sensitive point for some nations.

The problems confronting the UNFSA and its supporters
unfortunately go much deeper than the concerns voiced by some
non-parties. Four major challenges confront effective management of ocean fisheries; each obstacle is discussed below.

OVERFISHING AND OVERCAPACITY
Too many ocean fisheries suffer from overfishing and excess
fishing capacity, despite requirements in the UNFSA and other
international instruments to deal with these phenomena. The
FAO statistics on the poor status of marine fish stocks, including
many straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks, cannot be
ignored. Efforts to cap and reduce excess fishing capacity and to
eliminate subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing have met with limited success. Though many governments
(and industry representatives) recognize the general need to end
overcapacity, few have been willing to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve it.

IUU FISHING
Despite sustained efforts on many levels to combat IUU
fishing, such activities persist,
and may even be growing in
some regions and fisheries. As
key stocks dwindle, the potential profits available to cheaters
can increase. The difficulty of
monitoring fishing operations
far from shore, particularly in
high seas areas and areas under
the jurisdiction of developing
countries, exacerbates the situation. Governments, individually
and collectively, are trying to
deal with this classic “free
rider” problem by improving
monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing operations at
sea and in port (during landing
and transshipment), by reducing market access to illegally
caught fish, and by stiffening penalties imposed on violators.
However, as the Review Conference acknowledged, much more
needs to be done.

The Conference
emphasized the
importance of RFMOs in
the conservation and
management of highly
migratory and straddling
fish stocks.
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ECOSYSTEM CONCERNS
Overfishing can deplete both the stocks that are the target of
the fisheries as well as populations of species that are associated
with, or dependent on, the target stocks. Some tuna fisheries, for
example, result in significant accidental catch of seabirds and
sea turtles, although States and RFMOs are introducing measures to mitigate such “bycatch.” The catch of many sharks, either
as targets of fisheries or as bycatch, is poorly regulated. Some
fishing methods can also harm sensitive areas of the ocean floor,
for example where sponge fields or corals live, or in the vicinity
of some seamounts. The UNFSA sparked a concerted effort to
implement an “ecosystem approach to fisheries management.”
Because implementing this approach requires considerable scientific research necessary to understand the marine environment,
8

which is difficult and costly for nations with even the most
sophisticated fisheries management systems, this approach
remains far from being fully realized.23

LACK OF CAPACITY AMONG DEVELOPING STATES
The majority of nations that lack sophisticated fisheries
management systems — including most developing States —
cannot yet implement the UNFSA completely. They lack not
only financial resources, but also the technical know-how,
human resources, and infrastructure necessary to conduct proper
stock assessments, develop and
implement management measures, monitor fisheries for compliance, and impose penalties on
violators. In the pursuit of economic development, a number of
developing States (and some
developed States) allow high
seas fishing vessels to fly their
flags without any meaningful
ability or intention to control the
operations of those vessels.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE REVIEW
CONFERENCE

needed to improve its effectiveness.
The Review Conference also developed some stronger commitments to redress the overcapacity problem and to crack down
on IUU fishing. In particular, the Review Conference called for
greater coordination of measures across ocean regions and
among two or more RFMOs. One opportunity to make progress
on this front will occur in January 2007, when Japan will host
the first-ever meeting of the five RFMOs that regulate fisheries
for highly migratory stocks.24
Finally, the Review Conference gave rise to new commitments to assist developing
States Parties in the implementation of the UNFSA. A number
of vehicles for transmitting such
assistance exist, including a
trust fund established by the
States Parties pursuant to Part
VII of the treaty, which is jointly
administered by the United
Nations and the FAO. The FAO
also maintains other assistance
programs in this field, as does
the World Bank and other international financial institutions,
and some of the RFMOs. A number of developed States provide
additional assistance for fisheries management directly to developing States.

Too many ocean fisheries
suffer from overfishing
and excess fishing
capacity, despite
requirements in the
UNFSA.

Although these challenges are daunting, the Review Conference reaffirmed the commitment of nations to tackle them,
including through some of the specific undertakings described
below.
One recommendation to emerge from the Review Conference starts from the recognition that the best vehicles for regulating fisheries for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks are the RFMOs. Unfortunately, the performance of the
various RFMOs in fulfilling the responsibilities set forth in both
their own charters and in other instruments, such as the UNFSA,
has been uneven. The Review Conference recommended that
RFMOs be subject to a systematic performance review. If such
reviews were thorough and candid, they could, for example, create a “report card” revealing those areas in which each RFMO

CONCLUSION
The Review Conference brought the UNFSA to the attention of governments, international organizations, and a large
number of non-governmental stakeholders that participated in
the process. The very attention the treaty received during the
preparatory meetings and at the Review Conference has catalyzed action to improve its implementation. In that regard, a
notable outcome of the Review Conference was to keep the
treaty under review, through both annual informal consultations
at the United Nations and a resumption of the formal Review
Conference no later than 2011.

Endnotes: Fish Stocks Treaty Law
1 Though not clearly defined in international law, a “straddling fish stock” is

commonly understood to mean a stock of fish referred to in Article 63(2) of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNLOS”), namely, a
“stock or stocks of associated species [that] occur both within the exclusive
economic zone (“EEZ”) and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone.”
Examples include cod and other demersal fish stocks in the Northwest Atlantic
Ocean. “Highly migratory fish stocks” also occur both within and beyond the
EEZ, but are distinguished from straddling stocks by the vast distances they
typically migrate. Annex I to the 1982 Convention lists highly migratory
species, both fish (such as tunas and swordfish) and certain non-fish (such as
whales and other cetaceans). See United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
2 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory

Fish Stocks, July 24–Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
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December Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. DOCA/Conf. 164/37 [hereinafter UNFSA].
3 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Code of Conduct

for Responsible Fisheries, available at http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/
v9878e/v9878e00.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
4 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agreement to Pro-

mote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, available at www.fao.org/DOCREP/
MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130E00.HTM (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
5 UNFSA, supra note 2.
6 These informal consultations have met annually since 2002 to discuss issues

related to the implementation of the Agreement. See Overview, Conventions

Endnotes: Fish Stocks Treaty continued on page 75
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tion of water resources, institutional and financial arrangements,
enforcement of regulations, and dispute settlement.
Salman and Bradlow expound upon these basic principals in
their book. For example, the authors advocate that when legislators consider the principle of water ownership, they weigh the
benefits of state ownership of surface and groundwater versus
the benefits of awarding rights based on the historical doctrines
of riparian rights and prior appropriation. Under the same basic
principle, they urge legislators to devise a clear licensing scheme
that would allow individuals or entities to establish water systems or to dig wells. Correspondingly, the authors stress the need
for governments to devise rules for the transfer, suspension, and
revocation of licenses. Finally, Salman and Bradlow remind legislators to discuss how they might verify and regularize water
uses that existed before the legislation was revised or created.
In regards to the basic principle of institutional arrangements, the authors encourage legislators to specify which entity
has the explicit responsibility of regulating and managing water
to avoid duplication and overlapping of responsibilities. They
also devote a significant amount of text to the notion that institu-

tional arrangements should reflect decentralization of decision
making and public participation. Salman and Bradlow suggest
two ways to accomplish this goal: (1) to appoint river basin
authorities to play a role in the management of water, and (2) to
provide for water user associations to represent the interests of
users.
Though Salman and Bradlow emphasize that regulatory
frameworks need to take into account the socioeconomic and
cultural setting of each state, rather than follow a specified
model form or blueprint, the authors provide such an exhaustive
list of issues for experts and policymakers to consider. It is not
inconceivable that a government could successfully draw up a
legislative template using the book’s many concepts. For this
reason, Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study is an excellent resource for readers
who wish to understand the relevance and importance of water
legislation to the proper management and protection of water
resources.
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14 For an alternative perspective on the Review Conference process, as well as

and Related Agreements, United Nations Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of
the Sea website, www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/review_conf_
fish_stocks.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
7 Review Conference on the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provi-

sions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“Review Conference”), May 22-26, 2006,
Report of the Review Conference, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.210/2006/15 (July
3, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
review_conf_fish_stocks.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Conference Report].

its outcomes, a useful resource is the daily reporting by the Earth Negotiations
Bulletin, a non-profit organization that provides independent and on-going
reporting of international environmental negotiations worldwide. See Earth
Negotiations Bulletin, UNFSA Review Conference Ends in Consensus (May 26,
2006), www.iisd.ca/oceans/sfsrc/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
15 The Report of the Review Conference, which includes all agreed outcomes,

can be found at United Nations, A/CONF.210/2006/15; www.un.org/Depts/
los/convention_agreements/review_conf_fish_stocks.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2006).
16 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 43.
17 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 51.
18 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 62.

8 Conference Report, id. at ¶ 32.

19 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 72-75.

9 Review Conference, May 22–26, 2006, Organization of work, Item 9, U.N.

20 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 76.

Doc. A/CONF.210/2006/4 (March 28, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/los/convention_agreements/review_conf_fish_stocks.htm (last visited
Sept. 11, 2006).

21 Among the States Parties is the European Commission, as well as 16 Member States of the European Union. During the course of the Review Conference,
the delegation of Austria, in its capacity as President of the European Union,
indicated that the nine EU Member States that had not yet adhered to the
UNFSA would do so in the near term.

10 Review Conference, May 22–26, 2006, Elements for assessing the adequacy

and effectiveness of the Agreement, ¶ 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.210/2006/5
(March 29, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_
agreements/review_conf_fish_stocks.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).

22 There are 61 States Parties to the UNFSA as of October 26, 2006. A list of

11 G.A. Res. 47/1, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/31 (Nov. 29, 2005), available at

parties is available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological
_lists_of_ratifications.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).

www.un.org/Depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_resolutions.htm
(last visited Sept. 11, 2006).

23 Seventh Session of the UN Informal Consultations on Oceans and the Law of

12 Conference Report, supra note 7, at ¶ 13.
13 Several non-parties have for years raised concerns about Articles 7, 21 and

22 of the UNFSA and have called for re-negotiation or statements of interpretation of these provisions before agreeing to accede to the Agreement. However,
States Parties generally believe that such steps would upset the delicate balance
on those complex and sensitive issues that was achieved during the negotiation
of the UNFSA.

75

the Sea, June 12–16, 2006, Report on the work of the United Nations Openended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea at its
seventh meeting, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/61/156 (July 17, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/consultative_process_info.
htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006).
24 The five RFMOs in question are: the Commission for the Conservation of

Southern Bluefin Tuna, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Inter-American
Tropic Tuna Commission, the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas and the Western.
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